Just wrote this for a class. Reading it without indents and separate quotes is a little difficult, but it'll have to do. I also will not bother with the footnotes. Jed, you might look for the fascism I am both expressing and covering over here; I think Deleuze and Badiou were weighing heavy on me when I wrote this.The public is one, and the public is many − it is, perhaps, a too platitudinous formulation, reminding us only of what we quite readily understand: that the whole is both itself and its parts. Verily, we might say with Nietzsche, “‘public’ is a mere word. In no sense is it a homogenous and constant quality.” The term is ambiguous. It does not refer to anyone in particular; we might even speak of multiple
publics (a political public, a television public, a national public, a cosmopolitan public). But let us prod the formula just a bit. What is this business of a ‘one’ and a ‘many’? Ought we to understand ‘public’ as a relation of whole to parts, as ‘One’ to
its innumerable representations? Finally: if the ‘public’ is One, what, if any manner of singularity remains among the ‘many’?
Our aim will not be to answer questions like these, but rather to point towards
a thinking which has already engaged them. Here, we take ‘thinking’ in a universal, non-localized sense. The discussion could start anywhere that a concept of a public is already in play. The method is loosely dialectical: we start with a thesis about ‘publicness,’ and then proceed to treat potential antitheses and syntheses. As we shall ultimately see, our preliminary questions are not wholly spurious. The ‘One’ may or may not be precisely the remainder left over after any investigation of publicness.
*
In
Being and Time, Martin Heidegger provides his complex and infinitely multifaceted ontology. This ontology involves an idea of a public [
öffentlichkeit]: “Distantiality, averageness, and leveling down, as ways of Being for the “they”, constitute what we know as ‘publicness.’” Without delving too deeply into the Heideggerian nexus of neologisms, we can grasp the philosopher’s meaning in brief. Publicness describes the character of everyday
human existence (we can do without the term Dasein here), and it takes the form of a game of catch-up with one’s peers [distantiality]. Caught in (‘fallen’ into) this manner of social existence, we are suspicious of anything or anyone exceptional [averageness], and consequently, we seek to place everything on a common standing [leveling down]. Such paraphrasing is tenuous, as is any effort to de-ontologize Heidegger, but from this short delineation we get at a workable thesis of ‘public,’ one which is marked by what we might call a problem of public truth. “By publicness,” Heidegger writes, “everything gets obscured, and what has thus been covered up gets passed off as something familiar and accessible to everyone.”
This is a controversial thesis, and the ‘what’ or ‘whom’ of Heidegger’s ‘public’ must remain elusive to us (declining the opportunity to debate the ontological status of the “they” [
das Man]). Heidegger has been translated for us, and it is thus intrinsically problematic that we treat a sentence, such as the one just cited, as if Heidegger had been using the English term ‘public’ in his original text. Yet, this fact only reaffirms that we must treat with our concept elastically, allowing its connotative significance to flourish, however vague it may be. Our thesis, then, comes from the last quoted sentence. ‘By publicness, everything gets obscured.’ This axiom, as I hinted above, points us towards the question of ‘public truth’: granted that the public acts as Heidegger theorizes (‘distancing’ us, endearing us to ‘averageness,’ ‘leveling down’ the exceptional),
what precisely is getting obscured? Further, if something is obscured,
ought we not to seek to uncover it? The question becomes acutely personal: if what Heidegger says is true, and we are all alike submitted to a public which ‘covers up’ and ‘obscures’ − if one accepts this thesis, in all its levity and scope, what does one do next?
To distill the thesis and explore the consequences of such a thinking of publicness, we move now from the Heideggerian exegesis to an investigation of Buddhist literature. It is here that we find luculent images of the public− “the people of today who add branches and vines on top of branches and vines, all the time going far astray from the Truth.” Heidegger’s thought is rich with subtle characterizations of everyday life, and
Being and Time effectively spells out how one can remain ‘authentic’ by holding fast to certain ‘moments of vision’. Yet, what Heidegger’s text lacks is any concise formulation of an imperative. His ontology gives us the ‘is’ of publicness, but no ‘ought’; never are we told that we should
want to be authentic. Our thinking must turn to a path different from Heidegger’s now, a path with more certain aims.
As a framework for a Buddhist interpretation of publicness, consider the following two passages, written by the first and sixth patriarchs of Ch’an Buddhism:
You might think you can find a buddha or enlightenment somewhere beyond the mind, but such a place does not exist.
Learned Audience, our essence of mind, which is the seed or kernel of enlightenment, is pure by nature, and by making use of this mind alone we can reach buddhahood directly.
I place these quotations at the outset of the study to bring the question of public truth immediately to the fore. It would seem, from an extrapolary reading, that the patriarchs advocate a path leading to absolute privation: only in one’s own, individuated mind can one find enlightenment, only in the mind is there purity (as opposed to obscurity). Yet anyone at all familiar with Buddhism will know that such would be to grossly misconstrue the religion. Meditation practice
does put you at a remove from your public existence, it is
meant to set down all of the attributes of everyday existence which Heidegger describes, but it can nowise be said that
privation is the aim. Consider two passages written by modern commentators on Zen poetry:
Man is fulfilled only when unseparated from his surroundings, however hostile they may appear.
…remaining indefinitely under the Bodhi tree will not do; to muse without emerging is to be unfulfilled.
Arresting here is the idea of ‘fulfillment’, and the Heideggerian will be reminded of ‘authenticity’, which, in Heidegger’s understanding, is never possible ‘outside’ of public, ‘fallen’ existence, but only from within it.
We have just set up a synthetic binary the destruction of which will be the purpose of the remaining pages. The opposition is between eremitism on the one hand, and what we will call ‘bodhissatvaism’ on the other. By eremitism, I indicate the aforementioned tendency towards privation; the second term refers to the bodhissatva, the Buddhist practitioner who has vowed to save all sentient creatures, thus sacrificing his or her personal liberation from the cycle of rebirth to help others gain their own enlightenment. The binary is merely synthetic, artificial, because its poles are only representative of certain ‘moods.’ The following is a poem in the ‘eremitic mood’:
Why bother with the world?
Let others go gray, bustling east, west.
In this mountain temple, lying half-in
Half-out, I’m removed from joy and sorrow.
Starting with the bluntness of the question in the first line, the motif here would seem to be a celebration of privation. The poet, Ryushu, has achieved awakening away from the ‘general public,’ removed to the mountain temple. Yet, we must notice that even Ryushu, who has gained enlightenment and is ready to ‘let others go gray’ is still ‘lying half-in, half-out’, unable or unwilling to remove fully into sequestered existence.
In our present discourse, Ryushu represents the individual who has overcome the obscurities of publicness, renounced all connection to the everyday world, and who, for all that has been gained, still does not leave that world entirely behind. His poem dips far towards the pole of eremitism, but it does not expel the will of the bodhissatva. This will, taking the form of an imperative to spread the message and fruit of Buddhist practice, is vital to our understanding of Buddhism’s reconfiguration of public truth. It is manifest in the literature, as well as in the history of the tradition− for instance, in Dogen’s decision to curtail the elitism of Zen poetry, leading to a transition to an indigenous Japanese verse form. Buddhism is not characterized by missionary zeal in the traditional sense, but it places great stake in how its teachings are disseminated, and this brings us to an entirely new level of consideration in interrogating the idea of the ‘public’: even in the religion which first and foremost seeks liberation from an obscured (illusive) everyday, a renewed materialization of the public is inevitable.
This is the public of practitioners, about whom the masters of the religion must always ask themselves ‘How shall we communicate with the community? How shall we make them want liberation, and how show them the way?’ An entirely new public presents itself− the
sangha− which presents its own range of concerns and sources of ‘distantiality’ to its members. Buddhism reveals the depth of its circumspection here, as it has thought through this matter on its own. The main question of the three just posed, one which we asked ourselves at the end of the study of Heidegger, is the question of how one comes to desire liberation. Confronted with a public existence which ‘obscures everything’, what does one come to desire? What does one do? What
ought one to do?
The Buddhist tradition is filled with figures whose very vocation in life was an answer to this question. I am speaking of the recluse poets. I turn briefly now to one such poet, a recluse of sorts: twentieth-century writer, Ozaki Hosai. Hosai’s haiku are characterized by a playful rediscovery both of language and of the contemporanaity of natural events. With regard to our present inquiry into the question of publicness and public truth, Ozaki holds a special insight. It comes in the tiny phrase, ‘I throw out aloneness.’ This declaration provides a momentous turning point for our discourse, but in a rather subtle, even minimalist way. In one sense, there is here the sovereignty of the ego, the underlying, radical capacity of the ‘I’ to quell its despairing moods. This is not the sense we ultimately want to give to Ozaki here, but we need to look elsewhere to understand why.
We will return to Ozaki by building back through the stories of the patriarchs. The enlightenment story of the Sixth Patriarch, Hui-neng, is one of the most cherished of such stories in the tradition. Happening to overhear a reading of a sentence from the Diamond Sutra, Hui-neng spontaneously awakened to the essence of the mind, removing the obscurity (illusion) which had previously covered it over. What is the sentence that causes this enlightenment? “One should use one’s mind in such a way that it will be free from any attachment.” The line is by no means remarkable in itself; it is a basic teaching of Buddhism. Yet, a moment ago, I asked the question of the ‘ought’− what ought one to do having learned what ‘publicness’ is?− and here that question is answered. Hui-neng is enlightened precisely
by an ‘ought.’ It is not an imperative directly involving our Heideggerian thesis of the public, but it is an ‘ought’ all the same.
The significance of this story for us lies in the public nature of Hui-neng’s awakening. He hears another speak; this other, a member of some public, if only one as ‘innocent’ as the
sangha, reads from a sutra; and the line which enlightens Hui-neng is the one which tells him how he must use his mind. Here, we find just how conclusively we can break down the earlier-formulated opposition between eremitism and bodhissatvaism: the injunction to Hui-neng is privative (it appeals to his mind, his use of his mind), but it comes from a certain type of public, and ultimately, by leading him to become the Sixth Patriarch, it brings him to the fore of that same public realm.
When Hui-neng was enlightened, he realized “that all things in the universe are the essence of mind itself.” This understanding of the world eliminates any possible distinction between private and public realms.
This is Buddhism’s recant of the ‘problem of public truth.’ One is always already in a public station: one acts publicly, one responds publicly, one is even enlightened publicly. Thus, when Ryushu attains enlightenment and writes his poem in
spite of the external world, it is only one step in the cycle; this is why he must remain half-in, half-out. Privation and public being are only moods within a single practice. Bodhidharma writes,
"Responding, perceiving, arching your brows, blinking your eyes, moving your hands and feet, it’s all your miraculously aware nature. And this nature is the mind. And the mind is the buddha. And the buddha is the path. And the path is zen. But the word zen is one that remains a puzzle to both mortals and sages. Seeing your nature is zen. Unless you see your nature, it’s not zen."
*
We reach a point in our investigation when every single aspect of the question of publicness seems to slide into a single, connected progression. Bodhidharma takes us to our mundane activities, and astounds us by telling us that these are part of our ‘miraculously aware nature.’ ‘This nature is the mind’: there is in fact nothing privative here, because mind is also buddha, and buddha the path, and the path zen. Zen− the mystery, the puzzle to all men−, is to see one’s nature. And one’s nature is nothing else than the mundane activities of responding, perceiving, and arching one’s brows.
These activities, likewise, are the ways of one’s Being-with. They belong to the realm of publicness, and thereby to public distantiality, averageness, and leveling down. All of this is characteristic of the mind. “All things are the manifestation of the essence of the mind.” Ozaki’s statement ‘I throw out aloneness’ does not in fact reaffirm the ‘I.’ It could, in one sense, be understood as an imperative. “I, throw out aloneness.” The privative ego renounces its voluntary privation. The statement is more revealing still taken in the context of the patriarchs’ comments. If the mind is synonymous with ‘nature’ and ‘buddha’− if everything external is the manifestation of the very essence of mind, then surely, it is impossible to be alone. By the same token, there is nothing left that can be called ‘I.’ With neither the ‘I’ nor ‘aloneness,’ there is nothing to be thrown out. Ozaki’s haiku reveals the auto-nihilation of privation.
We are thus left with vastly reconfigured conceptions of the public, publicness, and public truth. Beginning with Heidegger’s thesis of publicness as something which obscures and covers over, we were led to the question of an ought. The ought takes the form of an awakening to the singular nature of mind and things, an uncovering of what the public has covered over. Obscurity: this is nothing other than what Buddhism calls Illusion. It is the public in which we immerse ourselves, and it is the public which covers over −− everything. And what is everything if not One? The mind, the many: all One? And is the ‘public’ a part of this One, covering also itself over? What is this strange, Eleatic prism that seems to be generating its own light?