finished finals finally
Here is a paper I recently wrote for my Concepts of Self in Classical Indian Literature class, taught by Prof. Scharf. It wasn't a very good paper, I'm aware - because I wrote the damn thing in a few hours during finals. Anyway the topic was completely insane - something like "Develop your own thesis of what the Self is, what the phenomenal world is, and what enlightenment is and how it can be reached, and compare that to the philosophies of Buddhism, Yoga, and Vedanta. 8 - 10 pages." I'm just posting this because somebody needs to kick the summer off right with a crappy finals essay, and maybe it will give me impetus to reread my work for once. Note to Barthes: Please forgive me for mangling you to fit my own cheap, callow purposes.
I got a B on the paper; I'll post Scharf's comments when I can find the actual paper.
Tyler Henry
CL 99
Final Paper
Due 5/11/05
The Un-Concept of Self
It is not difficult to elucidate in writing the act of writing itself. Yet through the process of that elucidation, no conclusion is reached. The reader is only made aware of the existence of the text and the fact that she is reading it. Furthermore, if she depends on the text’s explanation of itself – the meta-commentary – for her understanding, she can never escape the totalizing discourse of the text. Therefore, the act of writing is knowable but unexperienceable while reading – all that is experienceable is the continuity of reading. Even so, the text is, in this way, created both “before” and, presently, by (or at least propagated by) the individual reader (or subjective self). In fact, it might be said that the “readerly text”[1] is the same as the “reader,” as they propagate one another’s existence. This notion of totalizing textual meta-commentary is immediately akin to philosophical discourse, meta-physics, and modern cultural criticism – it analyzes what is normally taken for granted: the act of the writing of the “text” that is the “world” or “universe” or “phenomenology.” Yet this sort of meta-commentary necessarily retains the original structure that has already been naturalized within the subjective self, in order that it convey some sort of idea from one subjective self to another – it must lie within certain knowable delineations. The “true” Self – or Atman – on the other hand, is closer to what Barthes called the “writerly text”[2] – the complete-lack of structure – the origin and the telos (and therefore the non-narrative). The Self “is” the indifference of the subject and the un-difference of the object – as they are one in the same. This sense is best conveyed through paradox, for delineated logic cannot comprehend it:
The saint, O Vaccha, who has been released from what is styled form, is deep, immeasurable, unfathomable, like the mighty ocean. To say that he is reborn would not fit the case. To say that he is not reborn would not fit the case. To say that he is both reborn and not reborn would not fit the case. To say that he is neither reborn nor not reborn would not fit the case. [3]
Realization of this Self, therefore, must not take place through knowledge alone, because knowledge can only take place though (and therefore as a propagation of) structural definition (or “styled form”). Structural definition is only a convenient way of naming “things,” and these “things” are really only defined as a lack – there is no substance “behind” the name. “Verily now, your majesty, the word chariot is a mere empty sound. What chariot is there here?”[4] The name only creates the object through difference. This is the “readerly text,” whereas the “true” Self – the nothing AND everything “behind” the words – is the “writerly text.” “Consciousness,” or world experience, is a mixture of the “writerly text” and the “readerly text” to one degree or another. The concept of self to which I ascribe in order to “live within the world” predicates a linear, narrative (knowable) experience, for “I” am delineated as an (otherwise null AND full) object. The Buddhist tradition maintains: “…In the absolute sense there is no living entity there to form a basis for such figments as “I am,” or “I”; in other words, that in the absolute sense there is only name and form.”[5] Yet though the knowledge of this, as delineated, reasonable knowledge, is still limiting, it is possible to use knowledge as a guide in order to let go of knowledge. This is called Samadhi to the followers of Yoga and Buddhism, and it is both a practice and a state. However, Samadhi is not necessarily total and permanent – that would be instead the state of Kaivalya or Nirvana or Brahman described respectively by the Yoga, Buddhism, and Vedanta traditions.
The present moment in the “readerly text” is defined as the conjunction of past and future, which is dependant upon the idea of a narrative – conversely, the origin of the present, which is constructed just like the idea of a chariot, is the past and the telos of the present, constructed in exactly the same way, is the future. Yet in the “writerly text,” there is no distinction between past and future and therefore, there is no present moment. It is not fair to say therefore that the Self is eternal, because that invokes a delineated sense of time. The Self is and is not contained within time. It is contained within time from identification with the subjective self – the “I” – but the true Self is timeless.
In Buddhism, existence is expressed as a succession, for nothing is permanent: “…it remains a fact and the fixed and necessary constitution of being that all its constituents are transitory”[6] and, later, “nothing here exists but what has its own antecedents.”[7] In this way, the idea of “things” creates the idea of a narrative – whatever can be said to exist is only the present result of its existential cause, and it, in turn, is a cause to the future moment. This is the idea of “dependant origination.” Everyone and everything is in a state of becoming, not being, nor non-being. This can be understood as a conjunction between the “readerly” and “writerly text” – the “readerly text” is in this way a derivative of the “writerly text.” The readerly text is the projection of continuity and/or death onto the non-narrative of the writerly text. This complicated idea, and, again, it is something that can only be described and analyzed in terms (such as “dependant origination” or “succession”) that delineate it to make it knowable. However, once the truth is defined, it is no longer truth – it is only “empty sound.” As the Mahayana tradition says, “I, according to my ability,/ Have briefly demonstrated the principles of representation only;/ Among these all [other] kinds,/ Difficult to think, are reached by Buddhas [alone].”[8]
On the other hand, Buddhism tries to outline truth with the Four Noble Truths – the second and most important of which is that desire causes suffering. By desire is meant “the craving for existence, the craving for non-existence.”[9] This does not necessarily mean, however, that the craver wishes herself to exist or not exist, although that too is implied in the greater interpretation, which is that there is an “ideation”[10] (structural definition) which propagates senses of eternity and finality, when really “existence” is continuous flowing, like an ocean current, but with neither start nor end (or the start is the end), for the flowing is in no direction and all directions at once.
The question of the relationship of the “writerly text” to the “readerly text” that is implicated here makes up the major differences between the four major schools of Buddhism – Vaibhasika, Sautrantika, Yogacara, and Madhyamika – which are broken up into the two categories of Theravada and Mahayana. In short, the disagreement is on what “exists” and to what extent “we” perceive what exists. This, however, is misled philosophy. Existence and perception are the same thing, and they propagate each other just as the reader “creates” the text she is reading and the text “creates” the reader. So, then what is outside of the readerly text?
The un-concept. Unfortunately, it is indescribable, and therefore the repressive un- must be added to the concept (which signifies a birth) in order to repress the concept (the birth, life, death, and afterlife). The concept still lingers, however – though an idea of its disavowal may be passed on. In fact, this is how the concept itself works – it is conversely a disavowal of the un-concept. It is the demarcation of boundaries, which leads to the introduction of laws in the name of the Fear of the crossing of those boundaries – laws such as the “social contract.” It is interesting in this light how each of the philosophies of Buddhism, Yoga and Vedanta delineate strict laws concerning the Realization of the Self (accession to the “writerly text”). What is the merit to adhering to strict laws, and how will that lead to Realization? On the contrary, it seems that Realization is the reconciliation of the un-concept with the concept, to no longer disavow either of them but no longer create a difference between the two. Yet they are neither void, nor one, nor two, nor all three of those, nor the opposite.
The Yoga system, at its extreme, maintains a dualist philosophy and, thus, that Realization is only the untangling of the confusion that leads the Self – Purusa (passive consciousness) - to associate itself with the embodied-self, which is in fact a manifestation of active Nature – Prakrti. All action – and therefore all suffering – is a result of this ignorant yoking. In this sense, Purusa could be associated with the “writerly text” and Prakrti could be associated with the “readerly text.” In chapter 1 of the Yoga Sutra it becomes apparent that the de-confusion of Consciousness and Nature is achieved in ultimate Samadhi: “By the suppression of [residual potencies], too, all beings suppressed, comes the seedless trance.”[11] The “suppression of residual potencies” aspect of this step of Samadhi is interestingly similar to the repressionist aspect of the un-concept and the concept. The “trance” is the word used to denote non-thinking, or the withering of the structured world – or in other words, “attenuating afflictions… nescience, egoism, attachment, aversion, and love of life.”[12] Finally, the trance is seedless (even though it “comes” “by the suppression”), because, again, it is the origin and the telos.
With the description of the absolutely independent state of Kaivalya, which is comparable to the ultimate Samadhi, there arises in Yoga the question: What happens to Prakrti once the Purusa becomes independent? And, How many Purusas are there? These questions are akin to the discrepancies raised by the four schools of Buddhism. And, of course, the Answer is unknowable, for truth, again, cannot be delineated and remain truth. Yet if the “readerly text” or the Prakrti is taken to construct both “reader” (character) and text, and as such is the narrative derivative of the “writerly text,” it does not matter how “many” Purusas there are nor what happens to Prakrti in Kaivalya. Suffice it to say that “existence,” which is just structural definition, no longer exists as it is no longer read.
Vedanta takes a similar stance as Yoga (and even, through the un-concept, Buddhism), even though it argues only for its own stance, based on scriptural truth. The invocation of scripture immediately applies to the idea of a “readerly” and “writerly text.” This scripture should be at first taken as the “readerly text,” although, upon second glance, Vedanta argues that it is in fact authorless – and therefore at least akin to the “writerly text” (as the writerly text is without authorship – without limitation or attribution). The scripture argues for the unity of all things in Brahman. Brahman must be thought of in this light as the reconciliation (of the un-concept and the concept). Everything is Brahman, and every-not-thing is Brahman as well. This is a similar view to Yoga and Buddhism insofar as it attempts to dissuade an ignorance based on delimitation. According to the scripture, “all-knowing Brahman is the cause of the world.”[13] The all-knowing aspect of Brahman invoked her recalls the pure consciousness aspect of Purusa – and also it recalls the “writerly text,” which is not limited by definition and is therefore all-knowing (and without knowledge, like kaivalya). The description of Brahman as the cause of the world (and also, the world itself) is like the origin which is also the telos.
It is apparent that all three of these philosophies are attempting to describe the indescribable. Yet it is impossible to convey the “writerly text,” because to do so is to turn it into the “readerly text” – to delineate and define it. Realization of the Truth, which is the indefinable, therefore can only occur through the “cessation” of the “craving for existence, craving for non-existence.” Knowledge cannot in itself be Realization, but it may point out the workings of the “readerly text.” Realization, on the other hand, must be “seedless,” like the trance of ultimate Samadhi.
[1] Barthes, Roland, 1970, S/Z: An Essay, 4
[2] Ibid., 4
[3] Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli, 1967, A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, 291
[4] Ibid., 283
[5] Ibid., 285
[6] Ibid., 273
[7] Ibid., 285
[8] Ibid., 333
[9] Ibid., 274
[10] Ibid., 328
[11] Ibid., 462
[12] Ibid., 462
[13] Ibid., 513
I got a B on the paper; I'll post Scharf's comments when I can find the actual paper.
Tyler Henry
CL 99
Final Paper
Due 5/11/05
The Un-Concept of Self
It is not difficult to elucidate in writing the act of writing itself. Yet through the process of that elucidation, no conclusion is reached. The reader is only made aware of the existence of the text and the fact that she is reading it. Furthermore, if she depends on the text’s explanation of itself – the meta-commentary – for her understanding, she can never escape the totalizing discourse of the text. Therefore, the act of writing is knowable but unexperienceable while reading – all that is experienceable is the continuity of reading. Even so, the text is, in this way, created both “before” and, presently, by (or at least propagated by) the individual reader (or subjective self). In fact, it might be said that the “readerly text”[1] is the same as the “reader,” as they propagate one another’s existence. This notion of totalizing textual meta-commentary is immediately akin to philosophical discourse, meta-physics, and modern cultural criticism – it analyzes what is normally taken for granted: the act of the writing of the “text” that is the “world” or “universe” or “phenomenology.” Yet this sort of meta-commentary necessarily retains the original structure that has already been naturalized within the subjective self, in order that it convey some sort of idea from one subjective self to another – it must lie within certain knowable delineations. The “true” Self – or Atman – on the other hand, is closer to what Barthes called the “writerly text”[2] – the complete-lack of structure – the origin and the telos (and therefore the non-narrative). The Self “is” the indifference of the subject and the un-difference of the object – as they are one in the same. This sense is best conveyed through paradox, for delineated logic cannot comprehend it:
The saint, O Vaccha, who has been released from what is styled form, is deep, immeasurable, unfathomable, like the mighty ocean. To say that he is reborn would not fit the case. To say that he is not reborn would not fit the case. To say that he is both reborn and not reborn would not fit the case. To say that he is neither reborn nor not reborn would not fit the case. [3]
Realization of this Self, therefore, must not take place through knowledge alone, because knowledge can only take place though (and therefore as a propagation of) structural definition (or “styled form”). Structural definition is only a convenient way of naming “things,” and these “things” are really only defined as a lack – there is no substance “behind” the name. “Verily now, your majesty, the word chariot is a mere empty sound. What chariot is there here?”[4] The name only creates the object through difference. This is the “readerly text,” whereas the “true” Self – the nothing AND everything “behind” the words – is the “writerly text.” “Consciousness,” or world experience, is a mixture of the “writerly text” and the “readerly text” to one degree or another. The concept of self to which I ascribe in order to “live within the world” predicates a linear, narrative (knowable) experience, for “I” am delineated as an (otherwise null AND full) object. The Buddhist tradition maintains: “…In the absolute sense there is no living entity there to form a basis for such figments as “I am,” or “I”; in other words, that in the absolute sense there is only name and form.”[5] Yet though the knowledge of this, as delineated, reasonable knowledge, is still limiting, it is possible to use knowledge as a guide in order to let go of knowledge. This is called Samadhi to the followers of Yoga and Buddhism, and it is both a practice and a state. However, Samadhi is not necessarily total and permanent – that would be instead the state of Kaivalya or Nirvana or Brahman described respectively by the Yoga, Buddhism, and Vedanta traditions.
The present moment in the “readerly text” is defined as the conjunction of past and future, which is dependant upon the idea of a narrative – conversely, the origin of the present, which is constructed just like the idea of a chariot, is the past and the telos of the present, constructed in exactly the same way, is the future. Yet in the “writerly text,” there is no distinction between past and future and therefore, there is no present moment. It is not fair to say therefore that the Self is eternal, because that invokes a delineated sense of time. The Self is and is not contained within time. It is contained within time from identification with the subjective self – the “I” – but the true Self is timeless.
In Buddhism, existence is expressed as a succession, for nothing is permanent: “…it remains a fact and the fixed and necessary constitution of being that all its constituents are transitory”[6] and, later, “nothing here exists but what has its own antecedents.”[7] In this way, the idea of “things” creates the idea of a narrative – whatever can be said to exist is only the present result of its existential cause, and it, in turn, is a cause to the future moment. This is the idea of “dependant origination.” Everyone and everything is in a state of becoming, not being, nor non-being. This can be understood as a conjunction between the “readerly” and “writerly text” – the “readerly text” is in this way a derivative of the “writerly text.” The readerly text is the projection of continuity and/or death onto the non-narrative of the writerly text. This complicated idea, and, again, it is something that can only be described and analyzed in terms (such as “dependant origination” or “succession”) that delineate it to make it knowable. However, once the truth is defined, it is no longer truth – it is only “empty sound.” As the Mahayana tradition says, “I, according to my ability,/ Have briefly demonstrated the principles of representation only;/ Among these all [other] kinds,/ Difficult to think, are reached by Buddhas [alone].”[8]
On the other hand, Buddhism tries to outline truth with the Four Noble Truths – the second and most important of which is that desire causes suffering. By desire is meant “the craving for existence, the craving for non-existence.”[9] This does not necessarily mean, however, that the craver wishes herself to exist or not exist, although that too is implied in the greater interpretation, which is that there is an “ideation”[10] (structural definition) which propagates senses of eternity and finality, when really “existence” is continuous flowing, like an ocean current, but with neither start nor end (or the start is the end), for the flowing is in no direction and all directions at once.
The question of the relationship of the “writerly text” to the “readerly text” that is implicated here makes up the major differences between the four major schools of Buddhism – Vaibhasika, Sautrantika, Yogacara, and Madhyamika – which are broken up into the two categories of Theravada and Mahayana. In short, the disagreement is on what “exists” and to what extent “we” perceive what exists. This, however, is misled philosophy. Existence and perception are the same thing, and they propagate each other just as the reader “creates” the text she is reading and the text “creates” the reader. So, then what is outside of the readerly text?
The un-concept. Unfortunately, it is indescribable, and therefore the repressive un- must be added to the concept (which signifies a birth) in order to repress the concept (the birth, life, death, and afterlife). The concept still lingers, however – though an idea of its disavowal may be passed on. In fact, this is how the concept itself works – it is conversely a disavowal of the un-concept. It is the demarcation of boundaries, which leads to the introduction of laws in the name of the Fear of the crossing of those boundaries – laws such as the “social contract.” It is interesting in this light how each of the philosophies of Buddhism, Yoga and Vedanta delineate strict laws concerning the Realization of the Self (accession to the “writerly text”). What is the merit to adhering to strict laws, and how will that lead to Realization? On the contrary, it seems that Realization is the reconciliation of the un-concept with the concept, to no longer disavow either of them but no longer create a difference between the two. Yet they are neither void, nor one, nor two, nor all three of those, nor the opposite.
The Yoga system, at its extreme, maintains a dualist philosophy and, thus, that Realization is only the untangling of the confusion that leads the Self – Purusa (passive consciousness) - to associate itself with the embodied-self, which is in fact a manifestation of active Nature – Prakrti. All action – and therefore all suffering – is a result of this ignorant yoking. In this sense, Purusa could be associated with the “writerly text” and Prakrti could be associated with the “readerly text.” In chapter 1 of the Yoga Sutra it becomes apparent that the de-confusion of Consciousness and Nature is achieved in ultimate Samadhi: “By the suppression of [residual potencies], too, all beings suppressed, comes the seedless trance.”[11] The “suppression of residual potencies” aspect of this step of Samadhi is interestingly similar to the repressionist aspect of the un-concept and the concept. The “trance” is the word used to denote non-thinking, or the withering of the structured world – or in other words, “attenuating afflictions… nescience, egoism, attachment, aversion, and love of life.”[12] Finally, the trance is seedless (even though it “comes” “by the suppression”), because, again, it is the origin and the telos.
With the description of the absolutely independent state of Kaivalya, which is comparable to the ultimate Samadhi, there arises in Yoga the question: What happens to Prakrti once the Purusa becomes independent? And, How many Purusas are there? These questions are akin to the discrepancies raised by the four schools of Buddhism. And, of course, the Answer is unknowable, for truth, again, cannot be delineated and remain truth. Yet if the “readerly text” or the Prakrti is taken to construct both “reader” (character) and text, and as such is the narrative derivative of the “writerly text,” it does not matter how “many” Purusas there are nor what happens to Prakrti in Kaivalya. Suffice it to say that “existence,” which is just structural definition, no longer exists as it is no longer read.
Vedanta takes a similar stance as Yoga (and even, through the un-concept, Buddhism), even though it argues only for its own stance, based on scriptural truth. The invocation of scripture immediately applies to the idea of a “readerly” and “writerly text.” This scripture should be at first taken as the “readerly text,” although, upon second glance, Vedanta argues that it is in fact authorless – and therefore at least akin to the “writerly text” (as the writerly text is without authorship – without limitation or attribution). The scripture argues for the unity of all things in Brahman. Brahman must be thought of in this light as the reconciliation (of the un-concept and the concept). Everything is Brahman, and every-not-thing is Brahman as well. This is a similar view to Yoga and Buddhism insofar as it attempts to dissuade an ignorance based on delimitation. According to the scripture, “all-knowing Brahman is the cause of the world.”[13] The all-knowing aspect of Brahman invoked her recalls the pure consciousness aspect of Purusa – and also it recalls the “writerly text,” which is not limited by definition and is therefore all-knowing (and without knowledge, like kaivalya). The description of Brahman as the cause of the world (and also, the world itself) is like the origin which is also the telos.
It is apparent that all three of these philosophies are attempting to describe the indescribable. Yet it is impossible to convey the “writerly text,” because to do so is to turn it into the “readerly text” – to delineate and define it. Realization of the Truth, which is the indefinable, therefore can only occur through the “cessation” of the “craving for existence, craving for non-existence.” Knowledge cannot in itself be Realization, but it may point out the workings of the “readerly text.” Realization, on the other hand, must be “seedless,” like the trance of ultimate Samadhi.
[1] Barthes, Roland, 1970, S/Z: An Essay, 4
[2] Ibid., 4
[3] Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli, 1967, A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, 291
[4] Ibid., 283
[5] Ibid., 285
[6] Ibid., 273
[7] Ibid., 285
[8] Ibid., 333
[9] Ibid., 274
[10] Ibid., 328
[11] Ibid., 462
[12] Ibid., 462
[13] Ibid., 513
posted by Sturgeon General at 10:40 PM
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